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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of KEN-
NETH G. SCRIVENER, 
Deceased. 
SHIRLEY S. SCRIVENER, Execu-
trix of the Estate of Kenneth G. 
Scrivener, Deceased, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
ALBERT SCRIVENER and l\IHS. 
ALBERT SCRIVENER, as Trust-
ees for Gregory Scrivener, a Minor, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8186 
Kenneth G. Scrivener is the deceased father of 
Gregory Scrivener, a rninor six years of age. Gregory's 
mother was Ruth E. Scrivener whose marriage with 
Kenneth G. Scrivener terminated by divorce. Following 
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the divorce and on the 15th day of October, 1952, the 
said Kenneth G. Scrivener married one Shirlee S. 
Scrivener. A few months later, to wit, on the 3rd day 
of January, 1953, the said Kenneth G. Scrivener died as 
a result of an accident and left surviving him as his sole 
and only heirs at law his said son, Gregory, who was six 
years of age, and the said Shirlee S. Scrivener. The said 
Gregory Scrivener had never resided with nor made his 
home with the said Shirlee S. Scrivener. 
Albert Scrivener and Mrs. Albert Scrivener are the 
surviving parents of Kenneth G. Scrivener, deceased, 
and the grandparents of Gregory Scrivener. 
During his lifetime the said Kenneth G. Scrivener 
had taken out two life insurance policies on his life-one 
in the sum of $10,000.00 which was taken out while the 
said Kenneth G. Scrivener was in the Army, and the 
other policy in the face amount of $5,000.00 with the 
Prudential Life Insurance Company, the same being 
Policy No. 17655702. A photostatic copy of the Pruden-
tial Life Insurance Policy was introduced in the record 
and is made a part of the record on appeal (Exhibit 1). 
The cover sheet of this policy, among other things, con-
tains the following information: 
"Policy No. 
17 655 702 
Insured: 
Kenneth G. Scrivener 
The Prudential Insurance Company of A1nerica 
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Face Amount of Insurance: 
$5,000.00 
Policy Date: 
June 20, 1949 
:Modified Whole Life Policy" 
At the time of the death of the said Kenneth G. 
Scrivener both the $10,000.00 service policy aforemen-
tioned and the Prudential Life Policy were payable to 
the estate of the decedent. The sum of $10,000.00 was in 
due course paid under the service policy to the estate. 
The Prudential Life Insurance Company paid to the es-
tate the sum of $9,995.99 computed as follows : 
Amount of Policy No. 17655702 
Paid-up Additions 
Premiums Deducted $14.70 
Accidental Death Benefits 
Total 
(Exhibit 2) 
$5,000.00 
10.69 
5,000.00 
9,995.99 
All of the aforementioned facts were stipulated to by 
the parties in writing (R. 19, 20 and 21). 
The said Kenneth G. Scrivener on the 2nd day of 
January, 1953, or one day prior to his fatal accident, 
made his last will and testament (R. 1 and 2), which was 
thereafter admitted to probate in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, Htate of Utah, and the said Shirlee 
S. Scrivener was appointed executrix of the said last will 
and testament. The third paragraph of the decedent's 
last will and testament read as follows, to-wit: 
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"THIRD, I hereby give, devise, and bequeath 
to my parents, MR. and MR.S. ALBERT SCRIV-
ENER, or the survivor of them, of Rochester, 
New York, my $5,000.00 life ins1trance with The 
Prudential Insurance Company of America, 
Policy 17655702, to be held in trust for the uses 
and purposes hereinafter set forth: 
They, the said MR. and l\1RS. ALBERT 
SCRIVENER, or the survivor, as such trust-
ees, shall have full power to manage and con-
trol the $5,000.00 principal derhed from sa.id 
life insurance policy, with the power to invest 
or reinvest same as they may see fit so to do 
for the purpose of educating, maintaining 
and supporting n1y son, GREGORY SCRIV-
ENER, until such time as he shall reach the 
age of twenty-one years, at which time the 
said trustees are to pay over to my son, 
GREGORY, the balance, if any, of the $5,-
000.00, and after such payment, the said 
trustees shall then be discharged from any 
further liability on their part. PROVIDED, 
that if my parents predecease me, or that if 
they decease prior to the execution of said 
trust, I then request my brother, CLIFFORD 
C. SCRIVENER, of St. Louis, ~lissouri, be 
appointed substitute trustee, to be succeeded 
by my sister, l\fARY ELLEN WOODS of 
Rochester, New York, if need be." 
Shirlee S. Scrivener as such executrix tendered to 
the said Mr. and Mrs. Albert Scrivener the sum of 
$5,000.00 in full, final and complete payment of the said 
bequest, claiming that was all that was due under the 
terms and provisions of the decedent's last will and testa-
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ment. Albert Scrivener and his wife refused to accept 
said sum and claiined that they were entitled as trustees 
to the entire proceeds of said policy and filed a petition 
herein setting forth their claim (R. 5, 6 and 7). Upon 
the filing of said petition an order to show cause was 
issued and served upon the said Shirlee S. Scrivener, 
executrix, requiring her to show cause, if any she had, 
why as such executrix she should not be compelled to 
pay to Albert Scrivener and Mrs. Albert Scrivener as 
trustees for Gregory Scrivener the sum of $9,995.99, or 
the entire amount of the proceeds realized by the estate 
from the Prudential Insurance Company of America (R. 
3). The said Shirlee S. Scrivener filed an answer to the 
petition (R. 8, 9, 10 and 11), and in due course the matter 
came on for hearing before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, 
Judge, at which time the matter was submitted on the 
stipulated facts aforementioned and upon a photostatic 
copy of the insurance policy with the Prudential Life 
Insurance Company aforementioned (Exhibit 1), and the 
insurance company's computation of its manner of pay-
ment (Exhibit 2). The lower court made and entered its 
order awarding to Albert Scrivener and Mrs. Albert 
Scrivener as trustees for Gregory Scrivener the entire 
proceeds of the Prudential Life Insurance policy in the 
sum of $9,995.99, all as more fully reflected in the Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 12, 13, 14 and 
1;)), and Judgment (R. 16 and 17). 
It is from this Judgment awarding to Albert 
Scrivener and Mrs. Albert Scrivener as trustees for 
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Gregory Scrivener the entire proceeds of the Prudential 
Life Insurance policy that the executrix takes her appeal. 
As indicated by appellant's counsel, there is no dispute in 
the facts as all of the material facts were admitted by 
the stipulation or covered by the exhibits. The only 
question involved on this appeal is whether the lower 
court properly awarded to Albert Scrivener and Mrs. 
Albert Scrivener, trustees for Gregory Scrivener, the 
entire proceeds of the Prudential Life Insurance policy. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT NO. I 
THE WILL MADE A SPECIFIC BEQUEST IN TRUST 
FOR GREGORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL LIFE INSURANCE 
POLICY AND CARRIED WITH IT AS AN INCIDENT 
THERETO THE DOUBLE INDEMNITY PROVISION OF THE 
POLICY. 
POINT NO.2 
THE DECEASED DID NOT CONSIDER THE CON-
TRACTS FOR LIFE INSURANCE AND DOUBLE INDEM-
NITY AS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT BUT MADE A 
SPECIFIC BEQUEST OF THE ENTIRE PROCEEDS OF THE 
POLICY IN TRUST FOR GREGORY. 
POINT NO.3 
THE BEQUEST IN TRUST FOR GREGORY INCLUDED 
THE DOUBLE INDEMNITY BENEFIT. 
POINT NO.4 
BY MAKING HIS EST ATE THE BENEFICIARY OF THE 
INSURANCE POLICY THE DECEDENT EVIDENCED NO 
INTENTION TO LIMIT THE AMOUNT TO GO TO GREGORY. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE WILL MADE A SPECIFIC BEQUEST IN TRUST 
FOR GREGORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL LIFE INSURANCE 
POLICY AND CARRIED WITH IT AS AN INCIDENT 
THERETO THE DOUBLE INDEMNITY PROVISION OF THE 
POLICY. 
The third paragraph of the decedent's will evi-
denced a clear and unequivical intent on the part of the 
deceased to make a specific bequest of the life insur-
ance policy with the Prudential Insurance Cornpany of 
America in trust for Gregory. At the time the decedent 
made his will he undoubtedly had before him the Pru-
dential policy and the information contained on the cover 
sheet indentifying said policy. The policy was known 
as a life insurance policy. It was designated by a num-
ber and indicated the face amount of insurance at 
$5,000.00 and gave the name of the Prudential Insurance 
Company of America as the insurance company involved. 
In the third paragraph of his will the decedent identi-
fied the subject of his bequest by all of the foregoing 
information. The provision of the will read as follows: 
"I * * * give '» * * to my parents * * * rny 
$:i,OOO.OO life insurance with the J>rlldPntiall nsnr-
ance Company of America, Policy No. 1765570.'!." 
Certainly, the decedent could not have used rnore explicit 
information in describing the subject of his specific be-
quest. 
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Appellant argues that since he used the words "my 
$5,000.00 life insurance," that he intended to give the 
life insurance only and not the entire policy itself. We 
submit that the language in the will is not susceptible 
to any such interpretation; that the decedent made a 
specific bequest of the policy and described it by the 
only identifying data contained on the cover sheet of 
the policy itself. Frankly, we do not see how anyone 
could more accurately describe the policy than did the 
insured. The policy itself was identified as a life insur-
ance policy in the face amount of $5,000.00 and bearing 
a particular number, all of which was incorporated hy 
the de·cedent in his designation of the bequest. 
Appellant further argues that the bequest is limited 
because in the trust provision of paragraph 3 reference 
is made to the $5,000.00 principal deriYed from the life 
insurance policy and payment to the son, Gregory, of the 
balance, if any, of the $5,000.00 after Gregory became 
21 years of age. We do not construe this language as in 
any way limiting the specific bequest referred to in the 
earlier portion of the paragraph. The decedent simply 
did not have in mind the possibility of his dying in an 
accident and at the time he drew the \viii could not know 
he was going to die in an accident the very next day. He 
was simply using the figure of $5,000.00 as descriptive 
of the face ainount of the policy. Certainl~v, the decedent 
could not with any accuracy have referred to the amount 
of the policy as being anything other than $5,000.00 or 
the face amount specified therein. He spoke of the 
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"principal derived from said life ilnsurance policy." It 
was therefore clear that he intended the principal to go in 
trust to his son. The sum of $9,995.99 was in fact "the 
principal derived from sard life insurance policy." The 
lower court found no trouble in dealing with the trust pro-
visions of the will. It correctly found that the will made 
a specific bequest of the entire policy including the 
accidental death benefit and that the whole amount 
derived from the policy was subject to the trust even 
though the decedent in his will did not at that time know 
that he would die in an accident and that the amount 
derived would in fact be $10,000.00. 
\Ve agree that intent should be gathered from a con-
sideration of the whole paragraph, but in addition there 
should also be taken into consideration the fact that 
when the decedent drew his will, he had in mind pro-
tecting his son by a former marriage and his then wife. 
In this connection, at the time the decedent made his 
will he had two separate policies-one a $10,000.00 ser-
vice policy, and the other the $5,000.00 Prudential Life 
Insurance policy in question. We believe that it was the 
insured's intent to give the Prudential Life Insuranee 
Policy to his son, Gregory, and the proceeds of the other 
policy to his wife, and that this is clearly expressed in 
the will and in the specific bequest which he made of the 
policy to his son. 
It is argued that the deceased only intended to give 
the $5,000.00 life insurance portion of the policy and not 
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the accidental death benefit. If the decedent had in mind 
any such distinction between the $5,000.00 face amount 
of the policy and the accidental death benefit, he cer-
tainly would have so indica:ted in his will. Had he in-
tended the result which appellant would have this Court 
reach, he most assuredly would have written into the 
will that the accidental death benefits of the Prudential 
Life Insurance policy were not included in the bequest 
and either went to his wife directly or passed under the 
residuary clause of his will. The fact that he did not 
so specify conclusively indicates that he considered the 
policy as a whole and was making a specific bequest of 
that policy and any proceeds derived therefrom in trust 
for his son. The proceeds of the other policy in the 
principal amount of $10,000.00 of course passed to his 
second wife under the residuary clause of his will. 
The fact that more than the $5,000.00 face amount 
was derived fron1 the policy because of the accidental 
death benefit provision does not mean that the balance 
of the funds would not be impressed with any trust, 
because reading the will as a whole and considering the 
facts before the decedent at the time he made his will, 
it is clear that he was 1naking a specific bequest of the 
policy and all of the proceeds derived therefrom and 
accordingly any proceeds received regardless of the 
mnount are impressed with the trust, as the lower court 
indicated in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
If the appellant's argument were followed to its 
logical conclusion, so1ne very unusual results would 
follow. Assume, for the purpose of argument, that· the 
appellant's interpretation is correct. Then, assume fur-
ther that during his lifetime the decedent had borrowed 
the sum of $2,500.00 on his life insurance. This would 
leave only $2,500.00 received from the life insurance 
proceeds of the policy. If the decedent intended only 
the life insurance proceeds to go under the provision 
of his will, then all that the son, Gregory, could receive 
in trust would be the sum of $2,500.00, and yet the trust 
refers to the sum of $5,000.00 upon which counsel for 
appellant places so much significance. How, then, could 
counsel's argument as to the bequest being only for the 
life insurance proceeds of $2,500.00 be reconciled with 
his argument that the use of the sum $5,000.00 in the 
trust shows that the bequest was to be $5,000.00. Any 
additional sum would certainly have to come out of the 
accidental death benefit under the appellant's argument. 
The two bases on which the appellant attempts to prove 
the decedent's intent are thus inconsistent when put to 
the test and would lead to opposite results. The only 
reasonable interpretation is that which the lower court 
placed upon the provision that the bequest was one of 
the entire policy an1d all of the proceeds derived there-
from. 
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POINT NO.2 
THE DECEASED DID NOT CONSIDER THE CON-
TRACTS FOR LIFE INSURANCE AND DOUBLE INDEM-
NITY AS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT BUT MADE A 
SPECIFIC BEQUEST OF THE ENTIRE PROCEEDS OF THE 
POLICY IN TRUST FOR GREGORY. 
The insurance policy in question indicated that the 
total amount of premium during the first fiYe years was 
$14.70, and further that the total amount of premium 
after the first five years was $28.10. The policy then 
contained a notation: "Extra premium for accidental 
means death benefit (included in total premiums) $1.30." 
(Exhibit 1). The premiums were payable quarterly. 
Appellant in her brief states that the law is clear 
that the contract for double indemnity is separate and 
distinct from the contract for life insurance, although 
contained in the same policy. We cannot agree with 
this statement and the authorities do not bear out the 
appellant's conclusion. 
Appellant quotes from 44 C.J'.S. 1286 Sec. 336 in 
support of her proposition. However, appellant did not 
cite the entire quotation from C.J.S. on that subject. 
Following the sentence or portion thereof quoted by the 
appellant in her brief is the following: 
"But the rule is otherwise where the con-
sideration for all such liabilities was one and the 
same premium, and it has been held tlzat a policy 
with such benefits did not constitute several con-
tracts because a separate premium u·as charged 
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for disability benefvts where the premiums, al-
though to some extent separable, were irntegral 
parts of a single policy. * * *An industrial policy 
providing for benefits for natural death and for 
benefits for death by accidental means is a single 
policy of life insurance, and must be considered as 
a whole." (Italics ours) 
See also 29 Am. J ur. page 205, Sec. 189 : 
"A provision in a life insurance policy for 
disability benefits, which can be obtained only 
as a part of a policy of life insurance and sur-
vives only so long as the policy of life insurance 
continues in existence, cannot be regarded as an 
agreement independent of that for life insurance, 
made in exchange for an independent considera-
tion, although, pursuant to a requirement of the 
insurance department, the policy provides that the 
total premium stated on the first page of the 
policy includes an annual premium of a specified 
amount for disability benefits." 
See also the note to said section contained in the 1953 
Pocket Part reading as follows: 
"It is impossible to state broadly either that 
contracts evidenced by policies of life insurance 
with accident or disability features are entire, 
or that they are severable, or even to lay down any 
single test by which the question can be deter-
mined in every case. Thus, while in a number of 
cases life insurance policies with a(~eident or disa-
bility features have been held or declared to be en-
tire, and in a number of other cases such policies 
have been held or declared to be severable, it 
should be kept in mind that many decisions do not 
purport to go further than to hold that the par-
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ticular policy before the court should be regarded 
as entire or severable in view of the particular 
language used therein or of the particular circum-
stances under which, or of the purpose for which, 
the question was raised." 
See also Rhine v. New York Life Insu.rance Com-
pany, 273 N.Y. 1, 6 N. E. (2d) 74. In that case the policy 
provided that the total premium was $30.30 for life 
insurance and disability benefits and contained a pro-
vision that this preinium "includes an annual premium 
of $2.96 for disability benefits." The court said: 
"It is true that the plaintiff's policy contains 
two promises which for some purposes and in 
some contingencies are separable. The promise 
of life insurance could be obtained without prom-
ise of additional disability benefits and for a 
premium or consideration fixed as the price of 
the promise of insurance alone; choice rested with 
the plaintiff whether the policy should include 
disability benefits for an extra premium, and 
choice still rests with the plaintiff whether the 
promise of additional disability benefits should be 
kept alive by the continued payment of the extra 
premium. The pr01nise of life insurance would 
survive even if the promise of the additional 
benefits, and the extra pre1nium demanded for 
the inclusion of that prmnise, should be excised 
from the policy. Though to that extent the prom-
ises are separable, they are none the less integral 
parts of a single policy. 
"The rules which govern the effect of a breach 
or of the illegality of one promise, which for 
some purposes is separate from other promises 
contained in the same agreement, have no appli-
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cation here. We are concerned solely with the 
question of whether the defendant's promise of 
1disability insurance constitutes an independent 
agreement made in exchange for a separate pre-
mium, though embodied in a policy which con-
tains other promises. Concededly the promise of 
the disability benefits could be obtained from the 
company only as part of a policy of life insurance, 
and concededly it survives only so long as the 
policy of life insurance continues in existence. 
The test of the divisibility of a contract has been 
stated to be 'whether the parties assented to all 
the promises as a single whole, so that there would 
have been no bargain whatever if any promise 
or set of promises were struck out.' Williston on 
Contracts, Sec. 863. Since it is undisputed that 
the defendant would not have consented to the 
bargain for disability benefits unless it was made 
as a part of a polic~T for life insurance, and since 
the provision for djsability benefits can survive 
only as part of the policy, it is difficult to under-
stand how the provision for disability benefits 
can be regarded as an independent agreement 
made in exchange for an independent considera-
tion. 
"Policies of Hfe insurance may contain dif-
ferent provisions for benefits based upon varying 
risks. The premium is always based upon a cal-
culation of the anticipated cost of providing the 
promised insurance or henefits. We may reason-
ably assume that where one form of policy con-
tains a promise of insurance or benefits which is 
not included in other forms, the premium provided 
for the policy containing the additional promise 
would include an extra premium for the additional 
promise even though the policy does not contain 
a statement to that effect. The premium fixed for 
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a policy containing a number of promises might 
thus represent the sum of the amounts fixed hy 
calculation of each factor of cost; nevertheless 
all the promises would be given to the insured in 
exchange for payment of the total premium." 
See also Chastang v. Mttdual Life Insurance Com-
pany of New York, 65 N.E. (2d) 873 (Ohio), Re-hearing 
denied 68 N.E. (2d) 240, affirmed 71 N.E. (2d) 270. The 
court said: 
"The plaintiff contends that inasmuch as the 
semi-annual premium in the amount of $66.00 was 
broken down to show that $2.80 was the premium 
for the double indemnity benefit and $7.95 the 
premium for disability benefit, the court would 
be justified in concluding that the policy of in-
surance was separable. * * * The stipulation in the 
policy of the amount of the premium for the 
double indemnity benefit and for the disability 
benefits was made under instructions of the su-
perintendent of insurance, so that if the policy-
holder wished to terminate the disability benefits 
feature he would be advised as to the amount of 
the premium which would be due on the life in-
surance policy alone. We hold that the policy of 
insnrance held by the plaintiff constituted one en-
tire contract." (Italics ours) 
See also to the same effect New Y ark L~fe Insurance 
Company v. McCane, 124 S.W .(2d) 1057. 
See also 13 Appleman Insurance Law & Practice, 
Sec. 7 422, page 115 : 
"The calling of a life contract by one name 
or another does not change its character, since the 
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liability of the company is determined by the 
nature of the contract and not by its title. Nor 
does the addition of new features to a life policy 
divest it of its chief character or make it other 
than a life policy. 
"* * * However, a policy may contain pro-
visions for other benefits, such as those for in-
juries not resulting in death, sickness or accident 
benefits, or accidental death benefits without be-
ing removed thereby from the category of life in-
surance. The mere fact that a life policy may also 
include total disability benefits would not alter 
its character as life insurance. Such a policy can-
not be considered purely an 'accident and health' 
policy within the purview of a statute excepting 
from its provisions accident and health policies." 
In the case of New Y ark Life Insurance Company v. 
Davis, 5 Fed. Supp. 316, cited at page 11 of appellant's 
brief, the insurance company brought a suit in equity 
to eliminate from three life insurance policies the disa-
bility and double indemnity provisions. The policies 
would all have been voidable in their entirety for fraud 
by reason of false answers to the medical part of the 
application but for the incontestability clause contained 
in each policy which read: 
"This policy shall be incontestable after two 
years from its date of issue, except for non-
payment of premium and except as to the provi-
sions and conditions relating to disability and 
double indemnity benefits." 
The Court in that case correctly held under the incon-
testability clause that the insurance company could eli-
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minate the disa:bility and double indemnity provision~ 
from ,the policy notwithstanding the fact that the policy 
as to the life portion was incontestable. 
In Anair v. Mutual Life Insurance Company, -12 At. 
(2d) 423 (Vt.), 159 A.L.R. 547, cited at page 12 of appel-
lant's brief, the insured had assigned all of her right, 
title and interest in the policy to a bank, following which 
the bank authorized the insurance company to pay to the 
insured the disability benefits of the policy. The insur-
ance company sought to deny liability on the ground 
that the policy had been assigned to the bank. Quite 
reasonably, in that suit in an action against the company 
the contract was held to be divisible and the insured was 
properly permitted to recover for the disability benefit~ 
under the policy. 
A similar situation was presented in Armstrong 'C. 
Illinois Bankers Life Association, 29 N.E. (2d) 415 (Ind.) 
131 A.L.R. 769, cited at page 13 of her brief, and here 
again the policy was cons trued against the company to 
pennit an action to the insured for his disability benefits, 
notwithstanding the fact that the life policy itself had 
been assigned to his wife. It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that even in that case the court does not go as far as 
counsel in his brief and say that the la-w is clear that the 
contract is always severable. We quote as follows from 
the court: 
"In determining whether the questioned 
instrument shall be considered as constitutino- but b 
one entire contract, or as constituting two or more 
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separate and independent contracts, courts and 
text book writers have laid down several rules to 
guide us. It is said-primarily, the question of 
whether a contract is entire or severable is one of 
intention, to be determined from the language 
which the parties have used, and also the subject 
matter of the agreement. Another inquiry is, 
whether the parties reached an agreement regard-
ing the various items as a whole or whether the 
agreement was reached by regarding each item as 
a unit. 2 \Villiston on Contracts, Sec. 863. An-
othE•r important factor in the determination of the 
question is whether the consideration is stated to 
be given for each part as a separate unit or 
whether there is a single consideration covering 
the various parts. * * * A contract is entire when 
h~· its tenns, nature, and purpose, it contemplates 
and intends that each and all of its parts and the 
consideration shall be common to each other and 
interdependent. On the other hand, it is the gen-
eral rule that a severable contract is one which in 
its nature and purpose is susceptible of division 
and apportionment.' " 
In applying the rules laid down 1n that casP, certajnly 
the insured intended and treated this contract as a whole. 
In fact, he could not have bought the double indemnity 
benefits separate and apart from the life insurance con-
tract. He could have bought the life insurance without 
the double indemnity benefits, hut the double indemnity 
benefit was an integral part of the life insurance and 
eould not stand alone or be purchased separate there-
from. As stated by the New York Court in the case of 
Rhine v. New York Life Insurance Company, supra, all 
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of the prmnises were given by the insurance company in 
exchange for payment of the total premium. Certainly, 
the insured as well as the company in the instant case in-
tended and contemplated that both the life insurance 
benefits and the double indemnity provision were com-
mon and interdependent. 
In the case of Russo v. New York Life Insurance 
Company, 128 S. 434 (Miss.) 69 A..L.R. 883, cited at page 
14 of appellant's brief, the life policy contained a provi-
sion for sick benefits and also provided that the right 
of action for any sick benefits on the death of the insured 
accrued to the beneficiary. The insured was sick prior 
to his death and entitled to sickness benefits under the 
policy which he did not claim. Following his death, the 
widow sued for the life portion only of the policy andre-
covered from the company and then brought a separate 
suit to recover for the disability provisions. We think the 
court in that case properly held that the widow was en-
titled to recover also under the disability provisions since 
she had not recovered the smne under the former action 
and was entitled to it under the policy. The court held 
that the one cause of action accrued prior to the other and 
was separate and distinct and that two actions could be 
1naintained. We do not disagree with this finding, but 
do not believe that the case has any merit whatsoever 
in detennining the issues involved in the instant case. 
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The last case cited by appellant in her brief is 
Chatanooga Sewer Pipe Works v. Dumler, 120 S. 450 
(Miss.) 62 A.L.R. 999, in which the Mississippi court held 
that the money received by the insured under a life policy 
for disability benefits was not exempt under a statute 
which provided that the proceeds of a life insurance 
policy not exceeding $5,000.00 should be exempt from the 
debts of the decedent. There are, however, numerous 
cases holding to the contrary under the same set of facts, 
so that there is no unanimity among the authorities in 
this regard. 
Nee Fox v. Swartz, 235 :Minn. 337, 51 N.W. (2d) 80, 
30 A.L.R. (2d) 739. We quote from the facts as given in 
the ~ummary of the decision at the beginning of the case : 
"The cash surrender value and accumulated 
dividends of a fifteen-year endowment policy 
were sought by an assignee of a judgment against 
the insured to be subjected to the execution in-
volved in the instant proceeding. The policy pro-
vided for payment of a stated sum to the surviving 
wife or son of the insured in the event of the 
latter's death prior to the maturity, hut was pay-
able at maturity to the insured, who reserved the 
rights to change the beneficiaries and to have divi-
dends paid in cash, or applied to the payment 
of premiums or to the purchase of paid-up addi-
tional insurance, or left with the insurer as an 
interest-bearing savings fund payable upon death, 
maturity, or prior withdrawaL The policy had not 
yet matured and the withdrawal options had not 
been exercised by the insured. By statute, the 
beneficiaries of life insurance are 'entitled to its 
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proceeds against the creditors and representatives 
of the person effecting the same.' A provision of 
the statute as to premiums paid in fraud of credi-
tors was not involved in the case. 
"Vacation of the levy of execution was ap-
proved by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in an 
opinion by Matson, J ., which, ruling that the 
statute was not unconstitutional as creating an un-
reasonable exemption, or a discriminatory classi-
fication as to savings and investments, held that, 
prior to its maturity, the endowrnent policy had 
all the characteristics of life insurance and was 
within the statutory exemption from claims of 
creditors; and that the cash surrender and divi-
dend withdrawal options of the insured were 
purely personal to the insured and, where un-
exercised, were unavailable to creditors." 
Without taking more time to review the cases on 
this point, we refer the court to the annotation found at 
30 A.L.R. (2d) 751, wherein numerous courts have held 
that policies of endowment insurance both prior to ma-
turity and after rnaturity haYe been construed as life 
policies within the terrns of the exemption laws. 
See also American Trust and Bmz.~·ing Company v. 
Lessly, (Tenn.) 106 S.\Y. (:?d) 551, 111 A.L.R. 59. In that 
ease the court held that the proceeds of a poliey of in-
suranee against death lJ~~ accident were within the opera-
tion of the statute which provides tlrat "any life insurance 
effected b~~ a husband on his own life shall, in case of his 
death, inure to the benefit of his widow and child without 
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a'::. being in any manner subject to his debts," holding that in 
its broader sense, the term "life insurance" included 
accident insurance. 
There is therefore a sharp conflict in the authorities 
on the question whether a life insurance policy containing 
double indemnity provision in case of accidental death 
is one contract or in fact two separate contracts. .Most 
of the cases are decided upon the particular facts in-
volved in each case. In cases wherein an insurance com-
pany is a party, the courts are more generally inclined 
to find the contract severable, if necessary, to do justice 
between the insured and the company, and prevent the 
insurance company from defeating a claim by a techni-
cality. 
Appellant argues in her brief that the contract was 
severable and that the insured only intended to give the 
life insurance portion because of the severable nature of 
the contract and the fact that he referred to "life in-
surance." In the first place, as we have seen, the pre-
mise upon which counsel bases his argument is not sound 
as there is a sharp conflict in the authorities, and the 
law is not as clear as counsel would intin1ate. In the 
:-;e('oml place, the question, as we see it, is not whether 
the contract was in fact one or two separate eontracts, 
. but solely what the decedent intended when he made his 
will. His intent is to be gathered from the language in the 
will, considered under the surrounding ei remnstances, 
and the fact that he owned two life insurance policies-
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one a service policy in the sum of $10,000.00, and the 
other a $5,000.00 life policy with double inden1nity pro-
vision with the Prudential Insurance Company. 
Certainly, if the courts cannot agree on the principle 
whether the contract is to be considered divisible or not, 
it is unreasonable to ascribe to the decedent a knowl-
edge of the law and all of the various decisions in connec-
tion therewith and to say that he acted on the assumption 
that the contract was divisible. Such argument falls for 
another reason. If the decedent recognized the distinction 
that some of the courts had made between the life insur-
ance portion of the policy and the double indemnity por-
tion thereof, he would have shown such distinction by the 
wording in his will. Any man who recognized such a tech-
nical distinction, would not have left the matter in doubt 
in his will. To a person recognizing such a technical dis-
tinction it would have been a simple thing for him to 
provide that he was bequeathing the life insurance por-
tion only of his policy and that any benefits under the 
double indemnity feature were to pass under the resi-
duary clause of his will. The fact that the decedent did 
not do this is clear proof that he did not have any distinc-
tion in mind. We might add that in our opinion he had no 
idea that he was going to die by accidental death. He 
had two policies of insurance which he desired to cover 
in his will. In 1naking the specific bequest of the one 
policy in trust for his son he described it in the only way 
that an ordinary and reasonable man would have done. 
He used the policy number and name of the company, 
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the face amount of the policy and referred to it as what 
it was known to him and other people generally as a life 
insurance policy. There can be no doubt that he intended 
to give the policy or the entire proceeds thereof in trust 
to his son. 
POINT NO.3 
THE BEQUEST IN TRUST FOR GREGORY INCLUDED 
THE DOUBLE INDEMNITY BENEFIT. 
Certainly, the decedent did not know that he was 
going to die in an accident. He undoubtedly gave no 
thought to the double indemnity provisions of his policy. 
He had before hi1n two policies-the $10,000.00 service 
life insurance policy, and the $5,000.00 Prudential Life 
policy with the double indemnity provision. We believe 
it is clear that he intended to give the Prudential Life 
policy or all of the proceeds therefrom to his son in trust 
and that the $10,000.00 service policy should pass under 
the residuary clause to his wife. 
Counsel cites at page 16 of his hrief the case In re: 
Campbell's Estate, 27 Utah 361, 75 Pac. 851, to the effect 
that the deceased must have specific property in mind 
and the property must he ~o described as to he capable of 
identification. \Ye have no quarrel with the Utah case. 
In that case the deceased made smne provision in his will 
with reference to the proceeds of mines which were not 
in existence when the will was made and the portion be-
queathed could only arise, and as such become property, 
after the death of the testator. The court cited several 
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cases with approval defining a specific legacy and among 
other things quoted with approval fr01n Underhill on 
Wills, Volume 1, Section 407, reading as follows: 
"A specific legacy is a gift of a particular 
thing or of money, specified and distinguished 
from all things, and which at the execution of the 
will is owned by the testator, as of a horse, or a 
piece of plate, or of money in a purse, stocks of 
a corporation, and the like." 
Since the property attempted to be disposed of in that 
case was not in existence at the time, the court held that 
it was not a specific legacy and could not pass. However, 
the rule when applied to the instant case is otherwise. 
The Prudential Life Insurance policy with its double in-
demnity feature was in existence both at the time the 
deceased drew his will and at the time of his death. He 
described the subject particularly and with as much 
definiteness as it was possible for him to do, giving the 
number of the policy, the face mnount of the policy and 
the nmne of the company, and referring to it as life in-
surance, which was the designation in fact of the policy. 
F·rankly, we do not see how the decedent could have de-
scribed the subject of his bequest with more particularity 
and it certainly meets all of the tests of a specific bequest 
as laid down by the Utah court in the case cited by 
counsel. 
A gift of a life insurance policy carries with it all of 
the accretions as an incident to the policy itself. See 
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J.l1atter of Gans, 60 Misc. 282, (N.Y.), affirmed on appeal 
on other grounds in 195 N.Y. 346, wherein the court said: 
.. By the fifth codicil testator gave to his brother 
'Joseph Gans my life insurance of ten thousand 
dollars in the .Manhattan Life Insurance Company 
of the City of New York.' It appeared that he 
never owned a policy in the Manhattan Life In-
surance Company, but he had at the time of his 
death a ten thousand dollar policy in the Mutual 
Life Insurance Company. I am of the opinion that 
said last-named policy was a specific legacy, be-
queathed hy the testator to his said brother, and 
that it carried with the gift all of its accretions." 
(Italics ours) 
There are a number of cases in which it has been held 
that the specific bequest of a mortgage carries with it 
interest accrued prior to the death. In particular see 
Jlatter of Athans, 94 Misc. 43, (N.Y.) and In re Ama.ns 
Estate, 5 N.Y. f;upp. 2nd, 962. In the case at bar the 
double indemnity provision of the policy was an inci-
dent to the life policy and passed to the beneficiary under 
the ~pecific bequest of the policy itself. 
Appellant also cites the case of Waters v. Hatch, 
79 S.\V. 916 (Mo.), at page 16 of her brief. In that case 
the decedent held two certificates in the Bankers Life 
Insurance Company of $2,000.00 each and directed that 
when the money was paid that certain amounts should be 
paid and certain parties given money totaling $4,000.00 or 
the face amount of the certificates. Accumulations on the 
policy in the amount of $190.00 in excess of the amount 
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stated in the will were paid. The court held that Frank 
Hatch who was bequeathed the bal. of $100.00 was not en-
titled to the additional accumulation because it was a 
specific bequest of money. It is apparent from reading 
the provisions of the will that at no time did the decedent 
in that case attempt to give the certificates themselves 
but was giving the money, making specific money be-
quests, and erroneously cornputed the money to be de-
rived. We submit that a different result would have 
been reached in that case had the decedent made a speci-
fic bequest to his son, Frank, of the certificates in ques-
tion with the provision that out of the proceeds should 
first be paid the items to the widow and daughters re-
ferred to. Had the deceased made such a specific bequest 
of the certificates themselves, the accumulations would 
have passed to the son, Frank. However, having be-
queathed only the money, it was clear that the accumu-
lations coilld not pass under the clause in the will. 
The case cited by counsel is interesting for another 
reason. In another clause in the will the testator be-
queathed 60 shares of stock of Carthage K ational Bank, 
which was all the stock the decedent owned in the bank, 
and in the next clause bequeathed 20 shares of Carthage 
National Bank stock to someone else. As a matter of 
fact, the decedent owned 20 shares of stock in the Cen-
tral National Bank of Carthage in addition to the 60 
shares in the Carthage National Bank. The court in that 
case held that the latter bequest should be construed to 
refer to the Central National Bank stock, saying: 
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··By a mistake he spoke of them as being 
shares of stock in the Carthage National Bank, 
instead of in the Central National Bank of Car-
thage. By following the letter of the will and shut-
ting the eyes to the intention of the testator, this 
provision of the will would be nullified. But, if 
the intention is observed, the clause is full of 
meaning. It is the duty of the court to give such 
a construction to a will as will effectuate the mani-
fest intention of the testator as discerned from the 
whole will itself, and not to construe it as to cause 
any of the provisions to perish." 
In this case it is apparent that the decedent in tended 
to make a specific bequest of the Prudential Life Insur-
ance policy with all of its incidents in trust for his son, 
and that the other policy should pass under the T(e\Sl~ 
duary clause of his will. The fact that in the trust pro-
Yisions of the will he refers to the proceeds as being 
$5,000.00 was only because the insured did not know 
that he was going to die by accidental means and was 
not thinking of the double indemnity provisions. Such 
fact, however, should not prevent the insured's intent 
from being given full force and effect and upholding the 
specific bequest of the entire policy including the double 
indemnity provision in trust for his son. 
POINT NO.4 
BY MAKING HIS ESTATE THE BENEFICIARY OF THE 
INSURANCE POLICY THE DECEDENT EVIDENCED NO 
INTENTION TO LIMIT THE AMOUNT TO GO TO GREGORY. 
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Appellant argues that the various changes Inade in 
the beneficiary under the policy, and in particular the 
change made on September 11, 1952, making the proceeds 
payable to the executor and administrator indicated an 
intent on the part of the testator to limit the amount 
which would go to his son. It is claimed that this intent 
is shown because the decedent, in making his estate the 
beneficiary of the policy, subjected the proceeds to the 
claims of creditors and to other beneficiaries named in 
the will. This is not true because the bequest in trust 
to the son was a specific bequest. The residue of the 
estate was charged with the claims of creditors. 
No intent can be shown by reason of the change of 
beneficiaries. The reason for the original change in bene-
ficiary was undoubtedly because of l{enneth's divorce 
frOin his first wife. vVhy the policy was subsequently 
endorsed to nmne the estate as beneficiary, will prob-
ably never be known any more than the decedent's reason 
for 1naking the estate the beneficiary in his $10,000.00 
service life policy. The fact reinains he had two policies 
both payable to the estate and the intent clearly was to 
give one policy to his son, and the proceeds of the other 
to his second wife, as the residuary beneficiary. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Like appellant's counsel, we have been unable 
to find any case which is exactly in point. We submit, 
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however, that the only reasonable interpretation of the 
\Vill was that adopted by the lower court, namely, that 
the insured intended the Prudential policy with its double 
indemnity provisions to go in its entirety in trust to his 
son and for the other policy to pass under the residuary 
clause of the will to his wife. 
We submit that there was no error in the judgment 
made and entered by the lower court and that the same 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH & STRONG, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
604-610 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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